A US Marine Corps F-35B joint strike fighter jet. Logistically, almost none of our current weapons would be compatible with the F-35, meaning investing vast amounts in new air-to-air, ground and sea munitions, further complicating our already shambolic logistics
The F-35 is such an incredibly integrated platform that changing its sensors would be like asking Apple to manufacture an iPhoneX just for you — with a Google pixel camera, a Samsung galaxy OLED screen and a Nokia touch sensor, just to make it compatible with your Windows laptop and Android tablet
by Abhijit Iyer-Mitra and Angad Singh
The United States-produced F-35 stealth fighter seems to be the flavour of the moment in Delhi. Much of this has to do with a wink-wink, nudge-nudge campaign on since 2011 when it was reported that the US had offered a fixed price contract for the F-35A basic variant. Washington, at that point, swiftly dismissed rumours stating that the F-35 was not on the table right now. In private, top officials have been much more forthright giving us an emphatic “no.... there is a lot that needs to happen in the relationship before that conversation”. Surprisingly, more daydreaming by the air force has made manufacturer Lockheed Martin claim again that the F-35 is available to India, contrary to facts reinforced by official US government denials. This begs three questions: what are the operational impediments of the F-35? What are the associated costs? and what are the political sensitivities?
Operationally, the stealth tag merely makes it a great tactical fighter, while the real punch comes from the 5th generation tag, making it a node in a highly networked system of systems.
An inexact analogy is the iPhone X — it’s got great call quality, stunning visual, excellent camera, but imagine if it couldn’t interface with Gmail, Twitter, Paytm, Uber, or connect to Wi-Fi or 4G. In the F-35’s case not only is it unable to refuel from our current generation of tanker aircraft, it also cannot interface with India’s Integrated Air Command & Control System (IACCS) comprising ground and airborne radars, with customised data-links. Additionally the level of customisation for its target discrimination system that allows it to tell friend from foe, would have to be replaced completely as would all radio communications equipment.
Logistically, almost none of our current weapons would be compatible with the F-35, meaning investing vast amounts in new air-to-air, ground and sea munitions, further complicating our already shambolic logistics.